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This paper provides a challenging view to the tax harmonization issue. The 
literature often proposes tax harmonization to avoid free-riding behaviors in free-
trade areas, and more particularly in monetary unions. Countries may decrease 
their tax rates in order to develop tax competitive advantage and attract capital. 
Without tax harmonization, tax autonomy may lead to a “race to the bottom.” The 
model proposed here uses a game-theoretical approach to analyze this question. 
It shows that tax competition may lead to stability. The mechanism leading to this 
outcome rests upon the impact of the signal given by both players. If a country 
gives the signal that “friendly” taxation behavior is not its priority, the result can 
be a “race to the bottom”. Conversely, if both countries signal their ability to 
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In Economic and Monetary Unions such as the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), countries are highly interdependent. At the European level, 
monetary policy is managed by taking into consideration the euro-zone as a 
whole, rather than a particular country. Budget policies are constrained by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). At the macroeconomic level, structural and tax 
policies are more or less the main policies remaining in individual countries’ 
hands. 
European countries can make their economies more attractive by 
diminishing their tax rates? But each country faces twin objectives: follow the 
SGP (a deficit below the 3% of GDP ceiling and, on the average over the cycle, a 
zero deficit or a surplus) and seek high employment (or growth). Within this 
framework, it is important to study whether an “optimal” tax reduction would be 
better accomplished via competition or harmonization. 
Both processes have their costs. Under tax competition, each country’s tax 
policy is independent of the others, and free riding behaviors may occur. A sub-
optimal tax equilibrium for the monetary zone as a whole is possible. Tax 
competition may also create budgetary problems, and the objective of a balanced 
budget (required, on the average, by the SGP) may not be reached. Finally, the 
literature generally considers that tax competition could trigger a “race to the 
bottom”, i.e. lead to too low a tax rate (the lowest of all member states) and thus 
to sub-optimal public goods provision, insofar as countries would have to 
diminish their public spending, because of decreased tax revenue. (Zodrow and 
Miezkowski 1986), Cremer and Gahvari 2000). 
If tax competition is costly, one way to avoid these costs is to forbid 
competition. The early papers on the subject insist on the gains of implementing 
some mechanism for tax harmonization (Razin and Sadka 1991b). The largest 
support for this mechanism comes from models considering endogenously 
determined return on capital.  Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), and Persson and 
Tabellini (1992), show that fiscal competition leads to an under-provision of 
public goods, or to an inefficient redistribution. Others, like Bucovetsky (1991), 
are concerned about the efficient allocation of capital with a fixed public budget 
requirement. They show that there is room for some harmonization. 
If this literature tries to incorporate possible free-riding problems, it barely 
takes into consideration the costs of harmonization. It generally limits its analysis 
to the various mechanisms or procedures to implement such a harmonization (or 
cooperation), but neglects the economic and political costs of these mechanisms 
and procedures. The simplest form of cooperation can be a powerful one. It is the 
exchange of information on capital income accrued by foreign residents by tax   4
authorities, implying that the residence principle can be applied to capital income 
taxation. As shown by Bucovetsky (1991), and Razin and Sadka (1991b), the use 
of the residence principle leads to a Pareto efficient outcome, making further 
attempts to cooperate superfluous. Yet even though information sharing generally 
leads to efficiency, it is not guaranteed that all countries will be ready to 
participate in such tax cooperation. A given country can be better off under tax 
competition (e.g. because of asymmetries between member states) than under the 
efficient outcome. In this case, other forms of tax cooperation, like joint 
determination of tax rates, may be applicable. Another coordination mechanism 
may be built through a central fiscal authority (Cardarelli, Taugourdeau and Vidal 
2000), or through a capital control mechanism. In that case, Razin and Sadka 
(1991a) show that it is optimal, at least for a small open economy that is net 
capital exporter, to impose such restrictions, once foreign source capital income is 
tax exempt. 
Some analyses introduce the conditions of tax harmonization: for 
symmetric countries, Cremer and Gahvari (2000) conclude that the equilibrium 
values of the tax rates are less than optimal, and tax harmonization alone may lead 
to a less than optimal tax rate. For asymmetric countries, they show that 
integration may turn an honest country into an evading one. Tax harmonization 
alone may, therefore, be a bad policy, and make both countries worse off. It may 
also cause an otherwise honest country to become a tax evader. 
Too fast a tax harmonization may also create a strong economic shock, by 
changing the budget structure of a country.  Mendoza (2001) presents a case 
against European tax harmonization: “A European harmonization of capital 
income taxes (...) yields large capital outflows and a significant erosion of tax 
revenue for Continental Europe while the opposite effects benefit the United 
Kingdom.” 
In spite of these shortcomings, most of these papers are in favor of 
harmonization, mostly to help avoid free-riding possibilities under competition. 
Other research challenges the likelihood of a race to the bottom and discusses the 
implications – positive and negative – of tax competition. For instance Janeba 
(1998), Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjeldeberup 
(2000), and Janeba and Smart (2001), study the conditions under which targeted 
tax competition is less harmful than its remedies, and Krugman and Baldwin 
(2000) suggest that the tax game is something more subtle than a “race to the 
bottom.” 
Tax competition may have some positive impacts.. Firstly, member states’ 
freedom in establishing their tax policy may be one of their last national tools to 
fight asymmetric shocks. Secondly, it may be an effective way to correct market 
distortions. Thirdly, as mentioned by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), the pressure 
that tax competition may exert on government expenditures may help to avoid   5
waste and inefficiencies in the public sector. Finally, tax competition might lead 
countries to develop better tax systems; every country could learn from the 
experiences of others. 
All arguments considered, is it still possible to say that tax harmonization, 
as it is usually presented, is really the best way to organize the European tax 
system? The model proposed here analyses such a question. It is based on a game 
between two European governments. In such a model, it is not obvious that the 
lack of tax harmonization may lead to a “race to the bottom” between countries. 
Why is this so? A primary answer may come from the dynamics of the game and 
the appearance of commitment tactics. A secondary answer may come from the 
initial conditions and the original signal sent by participating countries. 
The proposed game is played within two different configurations. The first 
one is a one-shot game with no information sharing before the game starts. A 
signal is introduced in the second configuration while the game is repeated. It 
captures the signal sent by a country to the other player about its own ability - or 
desire - to enter into a “race to the bottom.” The model questions the free-riding 
assumption, and challenges the idea that it could lead to a “race to the bottom.” 
After an introduction, to the model, the first section presents the model’s 
assumptions. The second section discusses the unrealistic c onditions for free 
riding behaviors, and the third section demonstrates the unlikelihood of a “race to 
the bottom.” The fourth section highlights the policy implications, and the 





The proposed model is inspired by Barro and Gordon (1983), and Solow (1990). 
It is a game-theoretical model where the union consists of two countries 
producing a homogeneous good using capital and labor, and where each 
government follows tax and unemployment objectives. 
The model is original compared to the usual modeling in the tax literature; 
it uses a reduced form approach where the public sector does not need to be 
explicitly modeled. Country sizes are identical, as well as initial tax rates, so that 
the outcome is not to be predetermined by assumptions of cross-country 
differences. 
The tax rate used is the total tax burden of a country. The purpose of this 
approach is to capture the theoretical dynamics of tax  changes (not tax  levels) 
rather than the impact of specific taxes. 
Each country has a fixed amount of immobile labor and a fixed 
endowment of capital per worker. Technologies are identical in both countries and   6
exhibit constant returns to scale. Capital (financial and physical) flows freely 
between member states to equalize after tax returns. 
This original design aims to capture the strategic behavior between 
countries in an open-economy model. In other words, the emphasis is put more on 
countries’ strategies than on the structural effects of changes in tax policy. This 
approach leads to a new look at tax policy as a strategic game between countries.  
The change (in logarithm) in the country tax rate,  i t , with  {1,2} i =  is the 
decision variable. The “race to the bottom” means a decrease in this variable i.e. 
0 i t < . Assets movements between countries are linked to changes in variations in 
the tax rate. 
A decrease in the tax rate in one country increases the employment rate in 
this country, and has a negative impact on employment (and growth) in the other 
country, because of capital (financial and physical) outflows from the latter 
country. The economic structure is defined through: 
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where u is the equilibrium unemployment rate - countries’ sizes are assumed to 
be the same - and  i u  is the unemployment rate in country  i. 
In order to compensate the decrease in tax receipts that will probably 
occur, a country has to cut off spending or accept a wider budget deficit. Both 
countries have the following loss functions: 
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where a  is the relative weight of the two partial objectives. 
By substituting eq. (1) into eq. (2), the functions become: 
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  (3) 
In the next section the conditions for free-riding behaviors are presented. The 
discussion highlights the theoretical argument used in the literature in favor of 
harmonization policies. 
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PERFECT INFORMATION AND NO PENALTY POSSIBILITY: 
UNREALISTIC CONDITIONS FOR FREE-RIDING BEHAVIORS 
 
At the international level, there are two types of possible strategies: each player 
can choose to implement a “race to the bottom” strategy, i.e., to decrease its tax 
rate, or a “no-change” strategy. In the one-shot game, four occurrences are then 
possible: 
1.  both players do not play a race to the bottom game:  1 0 t =  and  2 0 t = . In 
such a case, 
2
1 Lu = ; 
2.  player #1 plays a race to the bottom game whereas the other does not want 
to play  such a game:  1 0 t <  and 2 0 t = . The tax rate variations that 
minimizes the player’s loss function are  ( ) { }
2
12 /,0 u tbabt =-+= , and 
the loss functions are: 
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  (4) 
3.  player #2 plays a race to the bottom game, whereas player #1 does not want 
to play such a game; the loss functions are the symmetrical of the previous 
ones. 
4.  both players play a race to the bottom game. The tax rate variations that 
minimize both players’ loss functions are:  12 / u ttba ==- . The 
decreasing tax rate has no impact on unemployment: 12 uuu == .¹ This tax 
bias explains why the literature generally argues that tax competition could 
trigger a “race to the bottom” - the “bottom” being the lowest sustainable 
tax rate, i.e. the lowest of all member states. Countries would then have to 
diminish their public spending insofar as tax receipts would decrease. 
Each player’s loss function is 








==   (5) 
In a perfect information model, with no cost associated to changes in behavior, 
the cooperative solution is dominated by the non-cooperative one. The only Nash 
equilibrium is for both players not to cooperate and to choose occurrence (4), the 
“race to the bottom.”² Large countries are likely to suffer revenue losses while 
small countries may actually gain.³ The optimal Pareto combination is obtained 
when both players cooperate. This solution is only possible if both countries agree 
on a credible rule, for example, a bilateral contract aiming at a stable tax rate. 
Otherwise, the dominant solution is the discrete one. 
   8
 
PERFECT INFORMATION AND PENALTY: THE UNLIKELY “RACE 
TO THE BOTTOM” 
 
Here, a new situation is studied: a possible penalty (an unexpected tax decrease by 
the other country) as in the Barro and Gordon's (1983) model. The model is 
designed as a repeated game with an infinite horizon and perfect information. The 
penalty decided by one country – private information – is communicated to the 
other player before the game starts.  
 
Players’ possible strategies 
Do players have a real interest in not cooperating? In other words, do they really 
have an interest in playing the non-cooperative game? The answer depends on the 
cost of economic distortion resulting from the cooperative solution. The gains or 
costs of distorting the other player’s expectations are evaluated with respect to the 
best possible result: 
 
2
12 LLu ==,  (6) 
Without the penalty possibility, if the optimal Pareto solution is chosen, the above 
results are obtained: 
§ if player 1 plays a “race to the bottom” game and player 2 does not, player 
1’s loss function is  ( )
2222
1 Luu bab =-+  rather than 
2
1 Lu = . His gain 
is ( ) ( )
22 u bab + ; 
§ Idem for player 2. 
Only a possible penalty may change the results of the model. Player 2 is able to 
punish player 1 in the following periods. Player 2 gains if he always plays the 
“race to the bottom” game, and player 1 doesn’t play such a race in the following 
period. Player 2 loses less in the case that player 1 plays the “race to the bottom” 
strategy. Yet, the latest solution brings about a loss compared to the optimal 
Pareto situation. It is therefore beneficial for both players to minimize the number 
of periods where the results are sub-optimal. Both players must quickly establish 
the penalty period if they do not want to lose continually through the “race to the 
bottom,” where the loss is: 







-=   (7) 
Given this information, both players decide on the duration of the conflict, and, 
thereby, on their strategies. 
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Equilibrium with a perfect signal 
Before the game is started, both players consider the penalty possibility, and thus, 
initiate the signals they share just before playing. It represents different values of 
a . The “signal” consists of the transmission of private information from one 
player to the other about the duration of the retaliation period in case of a sub-
optimal equilibrium. 
 
Proposition When player 1 gives more and more weight to unemployment, rather 
than to a decrease in the tax rate - in other words when a decreases - the penalty 
period decided by player 2 before the game, becomes shorter and shorter. 
 
Corollary When less and less weight is given by player 1 to unemployment, the 
second player’s penalty period increases. 
 
Proof A player plays the “no-change” strategy if the gains resulting from the 
“race” played at one period are lower than the present value of losses of the 
penalty decided by player 2. 




=+<  as the present value factor and  R, the real interest 
rate. A low d  means that the player does not exploit the penalty strategy for too 
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.  (9) 
If 
* T  is the period where the player can be indifferent between a “race” a “no-
change” strategy, eq. (9) implies that: 










.  (10) 
When 
* TT > , the present value of losses is higher than the gains from the “race.” 
The latter will therefore not be adopted. When 
* TT < , the gains from the “race” 
are higher than the present value of losses. This strategy will therefore be adopted. 











, with  ( ) 1, f dd = ,  0 fT ¶¶> and  0 f d ¶¶>, eq. (9) can 
be written: 
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Let us represent this latter equation through the following figure (for  0.96 d =  
based upon an interest rate of 4% and  1 b = ): 
 
Figure 1. Penalty period and changes in a . 
 
     
Figure 1 represents the length of the penalty period, based upon the weight given 
by the players to the tax. When a player gives less weight to a “race” strategy (a  
decreases), the penalty period becomes shorter. The outcome in a one-shot game 
may be inefficient, but in a repeated setting with appropriate punishment 
strategies and discount factors,  any individual rational outcome can be an 
equilibrium outcome (e.g. the folk theorem). With perfect information, the degree 
of retaliation captured by the transmission of the signal, pushes towards the 
coordination equilibrium. 
By definition, the race to the bottom game implies retaliation, and self-
discipline is motivated by the fear of the partners’ retaliation policies. Retaliation 
is completely credible in this context, because it corresponds to a dominant 
strategy. In light of this analysis, therefore, there is no need to harmonize taxes at 
the supra-national level in order to avoid a race to the bottom. The fear of a long 
retaliation period will push a  down. 
 
Corollary The price both players agree to pay for their credibility represents the 
signal they give before the game begins. In Europe, it may correspond to the 
possibility that a country may enter into a race to the bottom: does it have sound 
public finances, etc.? 




It is in the interest of each player to address a clear and strong signal to the other 
about its own strategy. In other words, it is in the interest of each player to let the 
other know that, if he tries to mislead in his expectations, he will be fired back 
upon by misleading from the other side. Hence, a strong signal on the part of both 
players would reduce the duration of the possible conflict, and diminish the 
volatility of the tax rate. 
The theoretical analysis sheds light on the role of tax policy in Europe, and 
more generally in a monetary union. If tax competition exists, the mechanism 
driving towards stability in the system rests upon the signal given by both players. 
If a country gives the signal that tax discipline is not its priority, the result can be 
a “race to the bottom.” Conversely, if both countries signal their ability to enter a 
tax war, this war doesn’t occur. The stability of the system is thus maintained. 
Considering the former process, it is of a paramount importance for a country to 
be able to give a strong and credible signal, to the other country, that it can enter a 
“race to the bottom.” For that, the country must have sound public finances. If it 
does not, then that country cannot engage in a tax war, and the partner country 
could then implement a free-riding strategy. 
This theoretical analysis reinforces the argument that the pressure on 
government expenditures helps to avoid waste and inefficiencies in the public 
sector, and that if countries have sound public finances, tax competition will not 





In the game-theoretical model proposed here, each government follows tax and 
unemployment objectives. The game is a one-shot game with two different 
configurations. The first is a true one-shot game with no information sharing 
before the game starts. A signal is introduced in the second configuration.  In this 
case, one player retaliates following a free-riding strategy played by the other 
player. 
The “one-shot” approach shows that tax harmonization is necessary in 
terms of system stability. The “repeated” approach, via the possible threat of a 
government’s reprisal, underscores the role of tax competition in reaching 
stability in the system. 
In general, the research relying on the free-riding assumption argues in 
favor of tax harmonization. Yet, with perfect information, and when penalty   12
possibilities exist, things are somewhat different. As shown in this paper, free 
riding may be discouraged through the threat of a government’s reprisal. 
The model could be improved upon by introducing imperfect information, 
and by building a signaling game introducing credibility problems. Some 
countries are in budgetary situations that make them credible in terms of their 
being able to conduct a “tax war.” Others are not. In that respect, some countries 
have higher incentives not to respect the cooperative equilibrium, and to be free- 
riders. Yet the simple model studied here is sufficient to show that the free-riding 





    1. It is a traditional result of temporal inconsistency enlightened by Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) and encompassed in Barro and Gordon (1983)’s formulation. 
    2. Note also that the equilibrium is symmetric because of the assumption of 
identical technologies. 
    3. This is a core result of most models focusing on the issue of size in tax 
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